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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have for a long time investigated trade-off mechanism between equity 
and efficiency. The question of what degree of redistribution, if any, would maximize 
society’s well-being is an essential question in economics. However, it surprises that little 
information about people’s preferences over the distribution of income in a society is 
available. Putterman, Roemer and Silvestre (1998) stress that preferences for equality may 
prove to be an important area for future research. Fong (2001) stress that the “reason why 
citizens of democratic countries support or oppose redistribution to strangers remain poorly 
understood, despite much research on the public sector and welfare states” (p. 225).  
 
Table 1 indicates that major shares of governments’ expenditures in European 
countries are devoted to reduce inequality among individuals. Social expenditure is now one 
of the main components of public expenditure and a significant proportion of GDP in 
European countries. 
 
Table 1.- Public expenditures in some European countries 
 
AUSTRIA GERMANY BELGIUM SPAIN FRANCE NETHERLANDS IRLAND  UK  DENMARK
TOTAL SOCIAL PUBLIC 
EXP./GDP  25,32%  22,46%  22,87%  13,53% 20,57% 17,34%  7,21%  14,99%  34,04% 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
EXP./GDP  66,94% 50,77% 63,06%  47,33% 56,45% 55,82% 34,77%  47,08%  68,20% 
TOTAL SOCIAL PUBLIC 
EXP/ TOTAL PUBLIC 
EXP 
37,82% 44,24% 36,27%  28,59% 36,44% 31,06% 20,74%  31,84%  49,91% 
Data for 2000 year, except Ireland (1997), UK (1998) and Denmark (2001) 
Source: IMF (2004) 
 
 
It is highly relevant to identify factors that shape the support for income 
redistribution in society. It looks reasonable that a lesser "necessity" of equality implies, in 
general, a smaller preference for redistribution and, therefore, a smaller support towards the 
  2social programs. On the other hand, social groups will support more redistribution if they 
expect to get benefits out of it in the near future. But there are many possible factors that go 
beyond traditional economics such as ideology, political interest, fairness perceptions or 
reciprocity or trust in institutions that seemed to be useful to consider.  
 
In this paper we try to determine individuals’ preferences for equality and 
redistribution, working with micro data from the 4
th wave of World Values Survey (1999-
2001) focusing on Spain (data collected in 2000) and its regions. According the authors 
knowledge, studies that investigate this type of studies are practically inexistent for Spain. 
Furthermore, the political structure in Spain is relatively decentralized which makes sub-
central governments (mainly, the Autonomous Communities), jointly with the central 
government, an essential part in the social policy process of solidarity and equality. Social 
expenditure in Autonomous Communities is almost 2/3 of the total public expenditure, 
mainly in Health and Education policies. Thus, we will have the chance to investigate in this 
paper the impact of regional conditions such as social expenditures or the level of income 
inequality on individuals’ preferences towards income equality. The results show that 
regional conditions have a strong impact on citizens’ preferences. A further aim of the paper 
is to search empirically for factors that have been strongly neglected in previous studies, 
such as, for example, informal education, perceptions about societies’ fairness, trust in 
institutions. The results indicate that these factors have a strong impact on individuals’ 





  3In Section II, we show some recent studies which anaysed the preferences for 
redistribution: Next, in Section III we explain the Spanish context and the importance of 
regional dimension. Section IV presents the data and testable hypothesis. Finally, in Section 





II. SOME RECENT STUDIES  
In this context, it is difficult to delimit the accurate notion we want to explain, 
because it is possible to find some linked concepts. In this respect, several notions such as 
equality, solidarity or redistribution have been analyzed in the literature. All of them are 
related to governmental interventionism. We will present now recent papers which have 
focused on some of those concepts, and basically on the preferences for equality 
redistribution. 
 
Arts and Gelissen (2001) speak about notions of solidarity and some principles of 
distributive justice. In order to measure those aspects, they defined some dependent 
variables measuring individual preferences in a multi-country analysis. To measure the 
solidarity levels, they use information about the level of government’s responsibility in 
several fields, such as providing jobs, heath care, decent standards of living, decent housing, 
reduce income differences or give financial help to college in those cases of real needs. 
Regarding distributive justice principles, they asked individuals about their opinion related 
to the characteristics that might have a hypothetic “just” society. The individuals value the 
importance of eliminating inequalities in income among citizens, of guaranteeing some basic 
  4needs for all in terms of food, housing, clothing, education and health and of recognizing 
people on their merits.  
 
Corneo and Grüner (2000) investigated empirically individuals’ attitudes toward 
political redistribution. They use the information included in the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), Social Inequality II (1992), focusing on U.S. data. To measure such 
attitudes, they used a question that asks individuals if they agree with the statement that it is 
governments’ responsibility to reduce income differences between people with high and low 
incomes. Similarly, Alesina et al. (2001) studied the preferences for redistribution using the 
General Social Survey (GSS), which asks individuals about how much they would support 
increased spending on welfare. The answer allows us to see individuals’ perceptions about 
the ideal spending on welfare relative to current spending. This fact helps to measure 
individuals’ preferences for a welfare state.  
  
Fong (2001) use data from the 1998 Gallup Poll Social Audit Survey, ‘Haves and 
Have-Not Perceptions of Fairness and Opportunity,’ related to a random sample of 5001 
respondents. Nevertheless, the main sub-sample (2738 individuals) only includes people 
who are in labor force and respond to all of the questions used in the regression. The author 
tests various hypotheses about why people support or oppose redistribution, but the primary 
focus is the role of beliefs about self- and exogenous-determination on reported 
redistributive policy preferences. Intuitively, self-determination can be influenced by a 
reciprocity principle. Individuals support redistribution because they expect that in the future 
they could be recipients of solidarity. Alternatively, exogenous-determination is closer to the 
equity principle itself and it has to do with a broad conception of social cohesion. The 
dependent variable in the model is an index of several questions on redistribution and the 
  5way it should be implemented (e.g., with high taxes, by means of private aid organization 
etc.). 
 
Corneo and Grüner (2002) try to identify the determinants of individual preferences 
for income redistribution in a society. They test for different hypotheses, which could 
explain the support for redistribution by taking into account three social perceptions. First, 
the so-called ‘homo oeconomicus effect’, inducing an individual to prefer a redistributive 
program A instead of another one B if and only if the individual’s net income is higher 
under A than under B. The second hypothesis or ‘public values effect’ goes beyond the 
private benefit and it induces individuals to support a redistributive program if it is well 
suited with their vision of the society as a whole. Thirdly, the ‘social rivalry effect’ takes 
into account the relative position of the person in society and the prestige of her or his 
occupation. The authors use data from the International Social Survey Programme, 
corresponding to 12 countries in Europe, America and Oceania in 1992. They run logit 
estimates, taking as the latent variable the personal agree or disagree with government’s 
responsibility on income redistribution. The more positive the answer to this question is, the 
more intense the individual preferences for redistribution are.  
 
Ravallion and Loskin (2000) analyzed the so-called “tunnel effect” in Russia, using data 
from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. They found than the individual attitudes 
towards redistribution depends on future mobility. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) found that 
redistribution preferences are negatively correlated with a subjective index of upwards 
mobility and an objective index of expected future income. They also found that individual 
perception about the equality of opportunities is an important feature in the determination of 
preferences for redistribution. Recently, Beckman and Zheng (2007) using data from 
  6questionnaire to 1096 respondents at the University of Alabama, analyzed the relationships 
among several personal characteristics and the preferences towards redistribution. They 
found that black people are fond of redistribution until income is well above average and 
whites oppose redistribution even if income is well below average. Additionally, those with 
incomes below average expect to move up and this prospect of upward mobility reduces 
support for redistribution.  
 
Summarizing, we have found different aspects linked to preferences for equality and 
redistribution in the recent literature. Some concepts have been analyzed from a national or 
multi-country level, but none of them has focused on the regional conditions in a specific 
country. That is an important contribution of our paper. Additionally, the fact of focusing on 
a specific country allows us to include a broad range of factors and to cover also the regional 
level. 
 
III. WHY IS RELEVANT TO FOCUS ON THE REGIONAL DIMENSION IN 
SPAIN? 
 
Spain is a constitutionally decentralized State in which regional governments 
(Autonomous Communities or ACs) enjoy extensive autonomy both in public expenditure 
and fiscal revenues. Nevertheless, there are at least three important differences. The first one 
in terms of regional development, the second one is derived from the constitutional 
framework and the third dissimilarity –the central key in this article- concerns citizens’ 
perceptions on income equality.  
 
  7Beginning with regional disparity in terms of regional GDP per capita, we can observe in 
graph 1 that 5 ACs (Castille-Leon, Cantabria, Canary Islands, Valencia and Aragon) are 
very close to the Spanish average (±10 points). At the lower end, there are Extremadura and 
Andalusia which do not catch up the 75% threshold whereas, on the contrary, Catalonia, 
Basque Country, Balearic Islands, Navarre and Madrid go beyond the 120% level. The 
relationship between the bottom (Extremadura) and the top (Navarre and Madrid) is almost 
1/2, confirming a relevant economic imbalance among regions in Spain.  
 




























      Source: Own elaboration from Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) data. 
 
Secondly, we can find different degrees of fiscal autonomy as it is recognized in the 
Spanish Constitution. Two ACs (Basque Country and Navarre) enjoy a special or ‘foral’ 
status that implies an almost-complete regime of fiscal powers, including collecting and the 
full fiscal regulation over a broad set of taxes (except for custom duties, Social Security 
  8receipts and other minor taxes and fiscal figures). Also, these two special ACs are allowed 
to decide on their own expenditures, except in some outlays which are exclusively assigned 
to the central government (mainly, Social Security pensions and Defense). On the other 
hand, the general group of ACs –15 over 17- are much more dependent on the grants from 
the central government than the ‘foral’ ones are. Before 2002, these 15 ACs only had direct 
responsibility on heritage, net wealth, property and lucrative transmissions taxes (wide 
autonomy but short takings); personal income taxes (very limited autonomy, subject to 
national regulation) and no autonomy neither at consumption taxes (only a proportional 
grant from the central government) nor corporate income tax. 
 
Regional diversity is even larger because expenditure powers significantly vary 
across ACs. While all ACs manage a set of common areas only Basque Country and 
Navarre and other 5 ACs (Andalucía, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Valencia and Galicia) also 
have direct responsibility on education and health systems. These two outlays are the most 
important regional expenditures in quantitative terms (more than 50% of total regional 
expenditure and more than 80% of social expenditures in year 2000). Table 2 shows that 
ACs with special fiscal regime (and wide expenditure powers) are logically the regions with 
the highest public expenditure levels (17,5% of GDP), but their social outlays are surpassed 
by the same ratio in general-regime ACs with wide expenditure powers (11,8% of GDP). 
This is because ‘foral’ ACs spend in many areas that the remaining ones do not. Other 
regions that do not enjoy broad expenditure powers present the lowest ratios in the two 
indicators referred to GDP. Nevertheless, we can infer that in these 10 ACs the orientation 
of their (small) budgets is clearly social (69,4% of total expenditure).  
 
















Total social public 
expenditure / Total 
public expenditure 
(%) 
1. Basque Country  SR  Yes  9,3 12,8 72,7
2. Navarre  SR  Yes  11,2 22,1 50,7
Partial average (1-2)      10,3 17,5 61,7
3. Andalusia  GR  Yes  12,8 20,1 63,7
4. Canary Islands  GR  Yes  12,3 15,9 77,4
5. Catalonia  GR  Yes  8,9 13,7 65,0
6. Valencia  GR  Yes  10,3 12,8 80,5
7. Galicia  GR  Yes  13,2 19,5 67,7
Partial average (3-7)      11,8 16,2 74,1
Partial average (1-7)      11,1 16,7 68,2
8. Aragon  GR  No  5,0 10,4 48,1
9. Principality of Asturias  GR  No  6,9 12,0 57,5
10. Cantabria  GR  No  6,3 10,3 61,2
11. Castille-Leon  GR  No  6,7 12,3 54,5
12. Castille-La Mancha  GR  No  6,4 14,9 43,0
13. Extremadura  GR  No  9,3 19,0 48,9
14. Balearic Islands  GR  No  4,0 6,2 64,5
15. Rioja  GR  No  6,1 9,7 62,9
16. Madrid  GR  No  4,2 5,8 72,4
17. Murcia  GR  No  6,7 10,1 66,3
Partial average (8-17)      5,5 8,0 69,4
GLOBAL AVERAGE (1-17)  ---  ---  8,6 13,1 65,6
(a) GR=General regime (short fiscal autonomy); SR=Special regime (broad fiscal autonomy). 
(b) No=It only consists of common expenditure powers. Yes=It also includes education and health 
Data for 2000 year. 
Source: Own elaboration, from Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) data and  ACs’ budgets. 
 
Finally, the ‘regional dimension’ in Spain is quite relevant because of different citizens’ 
perceptions on income inequality and regional economic development. Based on data from 
the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research surveys (CIS, 2002) we can see in Figure 2 
that we are not able to observe that there is no significant correlation between ‘real’ 
economic prosperity (GDP per capita) and ‘perceived’ economic development. The explicit 
  10question in the survey
1 asks the following statement: ‘Do you think that at present there are 
many, quite a few or very few differences in prosperity and wealth between different ACs?’ 
If we put together the ‘many’ and ‘quite a few’ answers, we obtain a proxy for the subjective 
perception on regional prosperity with an average level of 79%.  
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Source: Own elaboration, Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) data and CIS (2002). 
 
The least developed region (Extremadura) is also the one with the highest level on 
‘perceived’ income inequality (at the same level than Aragon). However, the richest region 
(Madrid) is not reciprocally the one with the lowest level on ‘perceived’ income inequality. 
‘Perceived’ income inequality tends to be lower in 5 of the 7 wealthy ACs (Rioja, Catalonia, 
Balearic Islands, Navarre and Basque Country) but they are in the same relative levels than 
other 4 ACs located under the average level of GDP per capita. Finally, we could say that 
there are considerable differences in terms of inequality perception (27 points between the 
                                                 
1 Over a sample of 10.476 individuals, proportionally shared among ACs according to population.  
  11heist and the lowest level) but there is no a significant relationship between ‘real’ and 
‘perceived’ prosperity.  
 
 
IV.- DATA AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 
In this section we focus in the empirical part on preferences towards income equality 
and ind
 
irectly towards redistribution. The data used in the empirical part is taken from 4
th 
wave of the World Values Survey
2 (WVS). The WVS is a worldwide investigation of socio-
cultural and political change, based on representative national samples. Although data from 
these surveys are made publicly available, economists have just started to work with the 
WVS. We are going to take advantage of this source in order to analyze individuals’ 
preferences for equality and redistribution in Spain. The representative sample was collected 
in 2000 and the following question. In the survey people were asked about the level of 
income equality they would wish, using a scale from 1 to 10 (1= Income should be made 
more equal, 10= We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort). To 
measure individuals’ preferences for income equality, the ten-point scale has been recoded 
in reverse order (10=1; 1=10). The model to measure individuals’ preferences for income 
equality is specified as follows: 
 
i i i
i i i i i
LOC IDSC
EMPLOY ECONSIT EDUC SOCIODEM EP
ε β β
β β β β β
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
6 5
4 3 2 1 0  
 
Pi indicates individual’s i preferences for equality. The independent variables considered 
are shown in Table 3. As can be seen, a broad set of variables is included in the estimations.  
                                                
E
 
2 It was first carried out in 1981-83, and subsequently in 1990-91, 1995-96 and 1999-2001. 
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First of all, almost all the studies have considered a bundle of socio-demographic 
and economic variables, which have an important influence on this issue. Some usual factors 
include
ndent Variables 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE  KIND OF 
VARIABLE 
CATHEGORIES/SOURCE 
d in this kind of studies are AGE and GENDER. Arts and Gelissen (2001) show that 
as that a higher age is correlated with stronger preferences for equality and equity, but on the 
other hand older people are less in favor of a public provision of preferential goods and 
services. Regarding gender, Arts and Gelissen (2001) found that women are more inclined 
to support a high level of solidarity and public provision of basic needs. However, Alesina et 
al. (2001) did not obtain significant differences between men and women’s redistribution 
preferences. On the other hand, Fong (2001) found that men had lower preferences for 
redistribution. Similar, Corneo and Grüner (2002) identified female and old people as the 
most likely to promote income redistribution. 
 
Table 3.- Indepe
Socio-Demographic Factors (SOCDEM)   




R Dummy  MALE  (r.g.) 
MARITAL STATUS   Dummy  ARRIED; OTHER (r.g.)  M
Formal and Informal Education (EDUC)   
EDUCATION Dummy  MIDDLE ED
DUC
UCATION; 
ATION;  UPPER E
OTHER (r.g.) 
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS  Scaled  1 = 
im
not at all important to 4 = very 
portant 
Economic Situation (ECONSIT)   
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION  Scaled  fied  1 = dissatisfied to 10 = satis
ECONOMIC CLASS  Dummy 
; 
/LOWEST CLASS (r.g.) 
UPPER CLASS; UPPER MIDDLE 
CLASS; LOWER MIDDLE CLASS
WORKING
Occupational status (EMPLOY)   
EMPLOYMENT STATUS  Dummy  ED;  SELFEMPLOYED; UNEMPLOY
OTHER (r.g.) 
Ideology and Social Capital  (IDSC)   
RIGHT POLITICAL ORIENTATION  caled  S 1 = left to 10 = right 
OTHERS TAKE ADVANTAGE  Dummy  WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE; 
WOULD TRY TO BE FAIR (r.g.) 
  13TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT  Scaled   4= a great deal   1 = not at all  to
TRUST IN THE GOVERNMENT  Scaled   = not at all  to 4= a great deal   1
RELIGION DENOMINATION  Dummy  INATION;  RELIGION  DENOM
NO RELIGION DENOMINATION 
(r.g.) 
Location variables (LOC)   
SIZE OF TOWN  Dummy  ;  UNDER 2,000 (r.g.); 2,000-5,000
5,000-10,000; 10,000- 20,000; 20,000-
50,000; 50,000-100,000; 100,000-
500,000; 500,000 and MORE 
SPANISH REGION   Dummy  NISH AUTONOMOUS 
EGIONS: MADRID (r.g.) 
17 SPA
R
INCOME INEQUALITY  us 
5)
Continuo Regional GINI Index for 2000 
year          
Source: Ayala-Cañón et al. (200
SOCIAL EXPENDITURES  Continuous  Social expenditures/total reg
public expenditures  
ional 




MARITAL STATUS is another aspect that has been considered. Alesina et al. 
arried people have less preference to increase welfare spending. Fong 
(2001) obtains sim
 
literature also presents mixed results. Fong (2001) shows that individuals with a college 
education or m
(2001) found that m
ilar conclusions, showing that married people are all significantly less 
supportive of redistribution than their counterparts. However, Corneo and Grüner (2002) 
found that marital status has not a statistically significant effect in the regressions. 
 
The formal EDUCATION of individuals is important in this context. However, the
ore were less supportive towards redistribution. Arts and Gelissen (2001) 
observed that there was a negative correlation between the educational level and the 
preference for solidarity, equality or equity, but positive in the case of the public provision 
of basic needs. Alesina et al. (2001) found a positive relationship between the support to 
increase the welfare state and the level of education. However, that positive relationship was 
non-monotonic, because high school dropouts demand more welfare spending that high 
school graduates, but people with graduate degrees have higher preferences for welfare 
  14spending than high school dropouts. In that case, the relationship between preferences for 
equality and educational level would not be strictly increasing. 
 
It can also be supposed that informal education matters. However, it surprises that 
variable has not been investigated in detail. It is possible that well-informed citizens, have 
ceteris 
ual’s income level may also be a key variable. Therefore, we have considered 
the individual’s ECONOMIC CLASS
. In general,  literature confirms a negative relationship 
betwee
                                                
paribus a higher preferences for equality, because they are better aware of the income 
inequality problems. Thus, it is not only interesting to investigate formal education but also 
informal education. One possibility to measure informal education is to find a proxy for 
individuals’ political interest. Thus, we include the IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS




n income and preferences for redistribution (Alesina et al. 2001; Arts and Gelissen 
2001; Corneo and Grüner 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). The majority of studies show 
that low-income people are very prone towards redistribution. Fong (2001) showed that 
individuals whose familiar income is very high are significantly less supportive of 
redistribution than those with low incomes. Corneo and Grüner (2000) found strong support 
that value differentials across income classes have an impact on attitudes toward political 
redistribution. Corneo and Grüner (2002) include a dummy variable equal one for those 
individuals that think their income goes up when inequality is reduced, and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient of this variable is positive and significantly different from zero, showing that 
the support to redistributive programs grows if the expected net income is positive. 
However, it has been found that a significant proportion of high-income people vote a lower 
 
3 Question: ‘How important is politics in your life?’   
 
  15level of inequality, even though this reduces their final income (Clark, 1998). This feature is 
clearly linked to the individual altruism or risk aversion level. 
Individuals’ preference for equality may also dependent on the financial satisfaction 
and not only per se on the level of income. To consider this, we include the variable 
FINAN
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS. For example, it 
can be expected that unemployed people have stronger preferences for redistribution, 
solidar
and social capital are important too (IDSC). This brings us to a further 
factor that is connected to politics
6. The party individuals votes for and their ideology are 
import
                                                
CIAL SATISFACTION
4. This variable is often linked to a successful upward 
mobility. So, as several studies pointed out (Ravallion and Loskin, 2000; Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005;  Beckman and Zheng, 2007)  
 
Another variable is the individual’s 
ity and some justice distributive principles
5 (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005).  
 
Ideology 
ant aspects too. It is a well-known fact that left party voters show higher preferences 
for redistribution and government initiatives. Thus, we use the degree of RIGHT 
 
4 Including both factors (economic situation and financial satisfaction) does not oppose collinearity problem as 
r is far below critical values.  
 
5 In a more elaborated way, Corneo and Grüner (2002) included three variables that link the social prestige of 
different occupations with the social standing or economic class. As expected, the model shows that this effect 
is negative, confirming that social status is an additional incentive for redistribution. 
 
6 At country/state/city level, political institutions matter. For example, the electoral system can conditioned the 
size of welfare state. In some cases, it have been observed a positive relationship between the proportionality 
of the electoral system and the amount of government transfers (Alesina et al, 2001).  
 
  16POLITICAL ORIENTATION
7 as a proxy for ideology. Moreover, we have included 
citizens’ TRUST IN GOVERNMENT and TRUST IN PARLIAMENT as independent 
factors. This variable is strongly connected to individuals’ ideology and their impact may 
dependent on the current situation or in other words the current political regime.  
 
In Spain, José Maria Aznar, member of the right wing Popular Party PP, was 
reelect
dditionally, we control for individuals’ RELIGION DENOMINATION. In our 
data, ar
                                                
ed president in March 2000. His party Popular Party (PP) obtained an absolute 
majority of seats in both the Congress of Deputies and the Senate as a result of the March 
2000 elections. Traditionally, right wing parties program are less inclined to support 
redistribution programs. Taking into account that the survey was conducted in November 
2000, it can be argued that trust also proxies citizens’ acceptance with current political 
programs. Thus, we would expect negative correlation between preferences towards’ income 
equality and trust in the government and the parliament.  
 
A
ound 83 percent of the population has a religion denomination. In general, we expect 
that people, who believe in God or are member of a church or religious organization, have 
stronger preferences for solidarity and equality. However, having a religion per see is not an 
indicator for religiosity or church involvement. Furthermore, being a minority (17 percent of 
the population) may lead to higher preferences towards equality in general and thus also to 
higher preferences to reduce income inequality.  
 
 
7 Question: ‘In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on 
this scale, generally speaking? Scale from 1 to 10’.  
 
  17Linked to the previous issue, we have considered an additional factor that is related 
to reciprocity or fairness. The individuals’ preferences for redistribution depend on the 
perception about the society. If they feel that the society in general (and thus also the ones 
who receive support) takes advantage and does not try to be fair, their willingness to 
improve income equality decreases. For example, if individuals believe that the poor are 
taking advantage of the system, they will be against redistribution policies
8 (Alesina et al. 
2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Therefore, we have included a proxy that measures 
individuals’ lack of trust towards society (TAKE ADVANTAGE)
9. 
 
We also include spatial variables. The intensity of welfare programs and the level of 
inequality in a specific place an individual lives can explain individual’s preferences 
towards redistribution and equality. On the one hand, we have considered the SIZE OF 
TOWN, Including several dummy variables. Alesina et al. (2001) finds a positive 
relationship between the size of town and the support to increase welfare. As we can see in 
the Table 4, Spanish local governments in big cities spend strong the efforts to improve 




                                                 
8 Alesina et al. (2001) showed that people who believed that blacks were lazy, are less motivated to favour 
redistribution policies. Corneo and Grüner (2002) used a dummy variable that equals one for individuals who 
think that hard work is at least fairly important for getting ahead in life, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of 
this variable is negative and highly significant, meaning that people who think that income is very elastic with 
respect to individual effort are less likely to support income redistribution programs.  
 
9 Question: ‘Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they 
to be fair?’  
 
  18Table 4.- Social public expenditures in Spanish municipalities  









PER CAPITA (in €) 
LESS THAN 5.000  2,775,990,000  6,926  6,114,592  453.99 
5-10.000 1,498,044,000  517  3,532,517  424.07 
10-20.000 2,045,032,000  337  4,704,465  434.70 
20-50.000 2,566,208,000  205  6,070,295  422.75 
50-100.000 1,831,641,000  66  4,458,891  410.78 
100-500.000 3,926,919,000  51  9,791,066  401.07 
500.000 AND MORE  3,637,073,000  6  7,166,068  507.54 
Data for 2002 year 
Source: own elaboration from INE (2005) and MEH (2005) 
 
The survey also provides information in which Spanish region and individual lives. 
Thus, we control for regional differences building dummies for all 17 SPANISH REGIONS 
(Autonomous Communities). The character or political orientation of the government is an 
issue that can have influence on individual’s valuations
10 (Esping-Andersen 1994; 1999). 
So, on the one side, in 1999, some regions had a right political orientation government. That 
was the case of Aragón, Asturias, Baleares, Castilla-León, Cantabria, Comunidad 
Valenciana, Galicia, Madrid, Murcia and La Rioja. In those cases, one expects to find lower 
values of EP.  
 
We are also going to include not only dummy variables but also factors that measure 
the regional conditions. We can expect that regional equality levels matter too. If the 
                                                 
10 Arts and Gelissen (2001) consider six groups of countries, depending on their welfare state regimen
10. They 
observe that individuals who live in conservative and social-democratic governments had higher preferences 
for solidarity.  
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11 in the region is high, it can be expected that people demand 
additional redistribution policies for improving equality issues and have therefore higher 
preferences towards income equality. Thus, we are going to include the regional GINI 
coefficient in the estimations. Finally, the level of SOCIAL EXPENDITURES in relation to 
the total regional public expenditures may also affect the equality preferences. A higher 
level of social expenditures should reduce the inequality feelings and thus reduce the 
preferences for more income equality.  
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The ordered probit models are relevant in such an analysis insofar as they help 
analyze the ranking information of the scaled dependent variable. However, as in the 
ordered probit estimation, the equation has a nonlinear form, only the sign of the coefficient 
can be directly interpreted and not its size. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a 
method to find the quantitative effect a variable has on individuals’ preferences towards 
income equality.  The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of citizens (or the 
probability of) belonging to a specific level, when the independent variable increases by one 
unit. Only the marginal effects for the highest preference towards equality are presented. To 
check the robustness of the results, in weighted least squares models are presented using 
preferences towards income equality as a cardinal variable. Furthermore, it should be 
noticed that answers as “don’t know” and missing values have been eliminated in all 
estimations. Weighted estimations have been considered to correct the sample and thus to 
get a reflection of the national distribution. For the least squares estimations we also 
                                                 
11 Ayala-Cañón et al. (2005) calculated regional Gini indexes considering the household net income obtained 
from the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (www.ine.es).  
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estimate beta or standardized regression coefficients. This allows to compare the magnitude 
and thus helps to see the relative importance of the used variables. 
 
Table 5 presents regressions using the variables TRUST IN THE GOVERNMENT 
(estimations 1, 4) and TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT (2, 3) separately in the estimations 
due to a high correlation among both variables (r=0.64) and as mentioned differentiating 
between ordered probit (estimations 1 and 2) and least squares estimations (3 and 4). In a 
next step we include in Table 6 the variables ideology (RIGHT POLITICAL 
ORIENTATION) in the estimation 5 and 7 and the perception about others selfish behavior 
(OTHERS TAKEADVANTAGE) in estimations 6 and 8. We had to include the variables 
sequentially in the estimations, due to the relatively higher number of missing values.  
 
As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, most results are robust regarding the estimation 
methods. The weighted least squares estimations using preferences towards income equality 
as a cardinal variable offer qualitatively quite similar results as the weighted ordered probit 
model. Socio-demographic variables do not have a very strong statistically significant 
influence on preferences for equality. Only some groups of AGE, such as individuals AGE 
30-39 and 70+ appear to have stronger preferences towards income equality compared to the 
reference group (AGE BELOW 30). Furthermore, we cannot observe gender differences. 
MARITAL STATUS is sometimes statistically significant, in the sense that married people 
show lower preferences for income equality.  Table 5.- Preferences for equality and redistribution in  Spain (I) 
   weighted        weighted        weighted     weighted     
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  ordered probit    ordered probit   least  squares   least  squares   
PREFERENCES TOWARDS INCOME   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.  t-Stat. Beta Coeff.  t-Stat. Beta 
EQUALITY (INCOMES MORE EQUAL)      Effects      Effects             
INDEPENDENT V.  1        2        3        4       
Socio-Demographic Factors (SOCDEM)                   
AGE                    
AGE 30-39  0.194 **  1.95  0.046  0.180 *  1.79  0.042  0.506 *  1.92  0.069  0.551 **  2.10  0.075 
AGE  40-49  0.053  0.47  0.012 0.052  0.46  0.012 0.117  0.40  0.015 0.128  0.43 0.016 
AGE  50-59  0.083  0.70  0.019 0.053  0.45  0.012 0.185  0.59  0.023 0.265  0.85 0.032 
AGE60-69  0.088  0.70  0.020 0.089  0.70  0.020 0.222  0.68  0.027 0.230  0.71 0.028 
AGE 70+  0.206 *  1.61  0.050  0.246 *  1.89  0.059  0.620 *  1.85  0.069  0.525  1.59  0.059 
GENDER                    
FEMALE  -0.014  -0.21  -0.003 -0.008  -0.13  -0.002 -0.005  -0.03  -0.001 -0.022  -0.13 -0.004 
MARITAL STATUS                    
MARRIED  -0.101  -1.37  -0.022 -0.102  -1.37  -0.022 -0.331  *  -1.71  -0.058 -0.325  *  -1.71 -0.057 
Formal and Informal Education (EDUC)                   
EDUCATION                    
MIDDLE EDUCATION  -0.127  -1.54  -0.027  -0.151 *  -1.82  -0.032  -0.379 *  -1.75  -0.061  -0.328  -1.53  -0.052 
UPPER EDUCATION  -0.269 **  -2.48  -0.054  -0.249 **  -2.28  -0.050  -0.663 **  -2.33  -0.086  -0.728 ***  -2.58  -0.093 
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS  0.154 *** 3.96  0.034  0.172 *** 4.32  0.038  0.436 ***  4.35  0.138  0.392 ***  3.99  0.124 
Economic Situation (ECONSIT)                   
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION  -0.047 ***-2.58  -0.010  -0.046 **  -2.48  -0.010  -0.114 **  -2.49  -0.080  -0.115 **  -2.56  -0.081 
ECONOMIC CLASS                    
UPPER  CLASS  -0.564  -1.52  -0.090 -0.629  *  -1.66  -0.095 -1.460  -1.40  -0.040 -1.289  -1.25 -0.035 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.207 **  -2.04  -0.043  -0.210 **  -2.03  -0.043  -0.575 **  -2.14  -0.078  -0.559 **  -2.12  -0.075 
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.188 **  -2.42  -0.040  -0.195 **  -2.49  -0.041  -0.472 **  -2.36  -0.079  -0.457 **  -2.29  -0.076 
Occupational status (EMPLOY)                   
EMPLOYMENT STATUS                    
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.126  -0.95  -0.026 -0.099  -0.74  -0.021 -0.205  -0.58  -0.018 -0.295  -0.84 -0.025 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.052  -0.40  -0.011 -0.061  -0.48  -0.013 -0.143  -0.43  -0.014 -0.126  -0.38 -0.012 
Ideology and Social Capital  (IDSC)                   
  22TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT       -0.114 **  -2.56  -0.025  -0.274 **  -2.37  -0.076      
TRUST IN THE GOVERNMENT  -0.099 **  -2.26  -0.022             -0.252 **  -2.23  -0.073 
RELIGION DENOMINATION  -0.283 ***-2.90  -0.070  -0.293 ***-3.02  -0.071 -0.620  ** -2.56  -0.080 -0.589  **  -2.42 -0.075 
Location variables (LOC)                   
SIZE OF TOWN                    
2,000 - 5,000  -0.284 *   -1.68  -0.055  -0.272  -1.58  -0.052  -0.652  -1.48  -0.063  -0.689 *  -1.60  -0.066 
5 - 10,000  -0.624 ***-3.84  -0.104  -0.636 ***-3.87  -0.103  -1.555 *** -3.75 -0.163  -1.529  *** -3.74 -0.161 
10 - 20,000  -0.365 **  -2.50  -0.069  -0.389 ***-2.58  -0.071 -0.922  ** -2.33  -0.099 -0.864  **  -2.25 -0.093 
20 - 50,000  -0.267 *  -1.68  -0.053  -0.281 *  -1.74  -0.055 -0.579  -1.40  -0.067 -0.558  -1.37 -0.064 
50 - 100,000  -0.297 *  -1.86  -0.058  -0.310 *  -1.91  -0.059 -0.690  *  -1.67  -0.078 -0.692  *  -1.70 -0.077 
100 - 500,000  -0.075  -0.52  -0.016  -0.069  -0.47  -0.015 -0.020  -0.05  -0.003 -0.039  -0.11 -0.006 
500,000 and more  -0.336 **  -2.14  -0.066  -0.361 **  -2.24  -0.069 -0.791  ** -1.97  -0.106 -0.737  *  -1.87 -0.098 
SPANISH REGION                    
Andalucia  -0.150  -1.31  -0.032 -0.181  -1.55  -0.037 -0.416  -1.40  -0.055 -0.345  -1.19 -0.046 
Aragon  -0.366  -1.46  -0.067 -0.372  -1.45  -0.066 -0.766  -1.26  -0.047 -0.772  -1.29 -0.047 
Asturias  -0.813 ***-4.15  -0.115  -0.827 ***-4.15  -0.113 -1.997  *** -3.88  -0.123 -1.970  *** -3.86 -0.119 
Baleares  -0.463 **  -1.69  -0.079  -0.466 **  -1.65  -0.078  -1.323 **  -1.81  -0.067  -1.310 **  -1.84  -0.067 
Cataluña  -0.741 ***-6.05  -0.124  -0.711 ***-5.80  -0.118 -1.908  *** -6.18  -0.249 -1.992  *** -6.46 -0.258 
Canarias  -0.755 ***-4.25  -0.111  -0.692 ***-3.75  -0.103 -1.707  *** -3.46  -0.108 -1.876  *** -3.95 -0.121 
Cantabria  -0.154  -0.43  -0.031 -0.234  -0.65  -0.045 -0.405  -0.44  -0.016 -0.156  -0.17 -0.006 
Castilla-Leon  -0.440 ***-2.90  -0.078  -0.456 ***-2.95  -0.079 -1.139  *** -2.88  -0.099 -1.108  *** -2.83 -0.095 
Castilla-La Mancha  -0.747 ***-4.37  -0.110 -0.746  ***-4.25  -0.108 -1.808  *** -3.98 -0.127  -1.821  *** -4.09 -0.126 
Extremadura  -0.075  -0.31  -0.016 -0.200  -0.78  -0.039 -0.507  -0.72  -0.026 -0.199  -0.30 -0.011 
Galicia  -0.708 ***-4.40  -0.110  -0.682 ***-4.15  -0.105 -1.645  *** -4.07  -0.143 -1.709  *** -4.30 -0.150 
Rioja -1.265  ***-2.78  -0.132  -1.288 ***-2.79  -0.130  -3.124 *** -2.92 -0.095  -3.091  *** -2.91 -0.092 
Murcia  -0.284  **  -1.95  -0.054 -0.255  *  -1.66  -0.049 -0.541  -1.25  -0.031 -0.644  -1.57 -0.036 
Navarra  -0.177  -0.50  -0.036 -0.231  -0.63  -0.044 -0.548  -0.58  -0.023 -0.419  -0.46 -0.017 
Pais Vasco  -0.810 ***-4.10  -0.118  -0.847 ***-4.19  -0.118  -2.078 *** -4.28 -0.168  -1.994  *** -4.16 -0.160 
Pais Valenciano  -0.951 ***-6.93  -0.135 -0.990  ***-7.03  -0.136 -2.513  *** -7.15 -0.264  -2.426  *** -7.01 -0.253 
(Pseudo)  R2  0.036    0.036    0.150     0.149     
Number  of  observations  1072    1098    1072     1098     
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F  0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 significance level 
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   weighted        weighted        weighted     weighted     
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  ordered probit    ordered probit    least squares    least squares   
PREFERENCES TOWARDS INCOME   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.  t-Stat. Beta Coeff.  t-Stat. Beta 
EQUALITY (INCOMES MORE EQUAL)      Effects      Effects             
INDEPENDENT V.  5        6        7        8       
Socio-Demographic Factors (SOCDEM)                   
AGE                    
AGE  30-39  0.164  1.49 0.036  0.165  1.53 0.039  0.480  *  1.71  0.066  0.489  *  1.74  0.067 
AGE  40-49  0.023  0.18 0.005  0.036  0.29 0.008  0.074  0.23  0.010  0.071  0.23  0.009 
AGE  50-59  -0.005  -0.04  -0.001  0.018  0.14  0.004 0.033  0.10 0.004 0.102  0.30 0.012 
AGE60-69  0.077  0.54 0.016  0.058  0.42 0.013  0.194  0.55  0.024  0.159  0.45  0.019 
AGE  70+  0.220  1.54 0.050  0.195  1.37 0.047  0.523  1.46  0.059  0.523  1.42  0.056 
GENDER                    
FEMALE  0.020  0.28 0.004  0.024  0.34 0.005  0.035  0.20  0.006  0.073  0.41  0.013 
MARITAL STATUS                    
MARRIED  -0.116  -1.41  -0.024  -0.136 *  -1.65  -0.031  -0.371 *  -1.79  -0.066  -0.411 **  -1.95  -0.071 
Formal and Informal Education (EDUC)                   
EDUCATION                    
MIDDLE EDUCATION  -0.186 **  -2.06  -0.037  -0.168 *  -1.87  -0.036  -0.453 **  -1.98  -0.074  -0.421 *  -1.80  -0.067 
UPPER EDUCATION  -0.210 *  -1.74  -0.040  -0.247 **  -2.14  -0.050  -0.525 *  -1.73  -0.071  -0.669 **  -2.24  -0.086 
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS  0.151 *** 3.46  0.031  0.144 *** 3.36  0.032  0.373 ***  3.48  0.119  0.360 ***  3.32  0.113 
Economic Situation (ECONSIT)                   
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION  -0.045 **  -2.11  -0.009  -0.041 **  -2.07  -0.009  -0.106 **  -2.08  -0.075  -0.098 **  -2.00  -0.069 
ECONOMIC CLASS                    
UPPER  CLASS  -0.406  -1.09 -0.066  -0.747  -1.46 -0.108  -0.758  -0.79  -0.022  -1.780  -1.27  -0.044 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.182  -1.53  -0.035  -0.223 **  -2.08  -0.046  -0.466  -1.56  -0.063  -0.598 **  -2.15  -0.080 
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.195 **  -2.30  -0.039  -0.239 ***-2.90  -0.051  -0.467 **  -2.20  -0.079  -0.593 ***  -2.81  -0.098 
Occupational status (EMPLOY)                   
EMPLOYMENT STATUS                    
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.161  -1.15 -0.031  -0.091  -0.64 -0.020  -0.355  -1.00  -0.031  -0.186  -0.50  -0.016 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.041  -0.27 -0.008  -0.085  -0.64 -0.018  -0.101  -0.26  -0.010  -0.186  -0.55  -0.019 
Ideology and Social Capital  (IDSC)                   
RIGHT POLITICAL ORIENTATION  -0.085 ***-3.33  -0.018       -0.206 ***  -3.40  -0.133      
  24OTHERS TAKE ADVANTAGE       -0.261 ***-3.58  -0.059       -0.646 ***  -3.45  -0.112 
TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT  -0.091 *  -1.86  -0.019  -0.135 ***-2.85  -0.030  -0.216 *  -1.75  -0.062  -0.326 ***  -2.66  -0.090 
RELIGION DENOMINATION  -0.231 **  -2.20  -0.052  -0.336 ***-3.20  -0.085  -0.438 *  -1.71  -0.059  -0.740 ***  -2.84  -0.094 
Location variables (LOC)                   
SIZE OF TOWN                    
2,000 - 5,000  -0.179  -0.99  -0.034  -0.258  -1.37  -0.051  -0.411  -0.90  -0.040  -0.615  -1.30  -0.059 
5 - 10,000  -0.593 ***-3.29  -0.092  -0.689 ***-3.67  -0.112  -1.410 ***  -3.14 -0.150 -1.655  *** -3.55 -0.170 
10 - 20,000  -0.364 **  -2.23  -0.064  -0.453  -2.64  -0.082  -0.852 **  -2.04  -0.096  -1.074 **  -2.41  -0.106 
20 - 50,000  -0.192  -1.08  -0.036  -0.366 **  -2.02  -0.070 -0.364  -0.83 -0.042 -0.761  *  -1.67 -0.086 
50 - 100,000  -0.241  -1.35  -0.045  -0.383 **  -2.18  -0.073 -0.452  -1.01 -0.050 -0.843  *  -1.90 -0.097 
100 - 500,000  0.015  0.09  0.003  -0.129  -0.78  -0.028  0.159  0.40  0.023  -0.151  -0.37  -0.022 
500,000 and more  -0.263  -1.49  -0.050  -0.402 **  -2.21  -0.078 -0.532  -1.24 -0.074 -0.877  **  -1.96 -0.118 
SPANISH REGION                    
Andalucia  -0.237  *  -1.89 -0.045  -0.082  -0.65 -0.018  -0.482  -1.57  -0.061  -0.169  -0.52  -0.022 
Aragon  -0.192  -0.67 -0.036  -0.321  -1.24 -0.061  -0.310  -0.48  -0.020  -0.684  -1.12  -0.042 
Asturias  -0.843 ***-4.11  -0.107  -0.823 ***-3.88  -0.117  -1.955 ***  -3.78  -0.130  -1.987 ***  -3.60  -0.126 
Baleares  -0.634 **  -2.05  -0.090  -0.424  -1.49  -0.075  -1.651 **  -2.12  -0.088  -1.224 *  -1.65  -0.066 
Cataluña  -0.871 ***-6.54  -0.128  -0.723 ***-5.69  -0.125  -2.145 ***  -6.74  -0.286  -1.954 ***  -6.10  -0.261 
Canarias  -0.717 ***-3.67  -0.099  -0.696 ***-3.43  -0.106  -1.693 ***  -3.31  -0.114  -1.716 ***  -3.13  -0.111 
Cantabria  -0.390  -0.95 -0.064  -0.476  -1.18 -0.081  -0.718  -0.66  -0.027  -1.092  -1.10  -0.042 
Castilla-Leon  -0.398 **  -2.47  -0.067  -0.464 ***-2.88  -0.083  -0.897 **  -2.25  -0.083  -1.153 ***  -2.79  -0.101 
Castilla-La Mancha  -0.702 ***-3.57  -0.098 -0.928  ***-4.82  -0.125 -1.585  *** -3.19 -0.116 -2.312  *** -4.64 -0.157 
Extremadura  -0.436  -1.26 -0.070  -0.344  -1.20 -0.064  -1.195  -1.34  -0.055  -0.986  -1.27  -0.048 
Galicia  -0.672 ***-3.87  -0.098  -0.712 ***-4.22  -0.111  -1.536 ***  -3.72  -0.141  -1.740 ***  -4.14  -0.151 
Rioja -1.632  ***-2.89  -0.126  -1.263 ***-2.65  -0.134  -3.625 ***  -2.91 -0.108 -3.078  *** -2.73 -0.098 
Murcia  -0.339 *  -1.75  -0.058  -0.322 *  -1.85  -0.060  -0.648  -1.23  -0.034  -0.681  -1.40  -0.035 
Navarra  -0.358  -0.80 -0.060  -0.285  -0.69 -0.055  -0.793  -0.73  -0.030  -0.656  -0.61  -0.027 
Pais Vasco  -0.784 ***-3.48  -0.105  -0.900 ***-4.17  -0.125  -1.871 ***  -3.50 -0.140 -2.226  *** -4.33 -0.175 
Pais Valenciano  -0.992 ***-6.54  -0.129 -1.052  ***-6.51  -0.141 -2.360  *** -6.49 -0.266 -2.642  *** -6.59 -0.252 
(Pseudo)  R2  0.044    0.043    0.179     0.174     
Number  of  observations  889    946    889    946    
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F  0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
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*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 significance level. 
  
 
  We observe a negative relationship between formal EDUCATION and EP. In general, 
people with the highest education (UPPER EDUCATION) also show the lowest preferences 
to improve income equality. The marginal effects indicate that being in this group rather than 
in the reference group (lowest level of education) reduces the probability of stating that 
income should be made more equal by around 5 percentage points. On the other hand, 
informal education or individuals’ political interest measured with the variable 
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS is positively correlated and statistically significant with 
preferences towards income equality. An increase in the importance of politics scale by one 
unit raises the probability of report that income should be made more equal by more than 3 
percentage points. The results remain robust after including ideology and societies’ fairness 
perceptions in Table 6. The beta coefficient in the least squares estimations indicates a 
relatively strong impact of political interest on preferences towards income equality compared 
to other variables.  
 
  Additionally, the economic situation matter too. The results indicate that a higher level 
of FINANCIAL SATISFACTION leads to a lower preference for income equality. This result 
remains robust after controlling for individuals’ perception about their ECONOMIC CLASS 
status. The marginal effects indicate that an increase in the financial satisfaction by one scale 
reduces the share of people stating that income should be made more equal by around 1 
percentage point. The economic class variables indicate that the lowest class has the highest 
preferences towards equality. However, the effect is non-linear as the coefficient for the 
highest economic class is in most of the cases not statistically significant. Finally, statistically 
significant differences among the EMPLOYMENT STATUS were not observable. 
 
  26Table 6 indicates that ideology has an impact on our dependent variable. Individual’s 
RIGHT POLITICAL ORIENTATION is negatively correlated with EP with a marginal effect 
of 1.8 percentage points. The beta coefficient reported in estimation 7 also shows a strong 
relative impact of ideology on EP. It looks as if people with right political orientation are 
more in favor of preserving the economic results linked to the personal effort rather than 
improving the income equality situation. Furthermore, a higher TRUST IN THE 
PARLIAMENT and the GOVERNMENT leads to a lower EP with marginal effects around 2 
percentage points. The result is consistent with the ideology, taking into account the right 
wing government and the strong representation of the right wing in the parliament in 
November 2000. Furthermore, it can be argued that people with a lower trust in these 
institutions have a higher demand to improve the (social) situation in Spain. Interestingly, 
people without a religion denomination have the strongest preferences to improve income 
inequality, perhaps due to the fact that they are a minority in Spain. Having a religion is not 
connected to the level of religiosity or church involvement. However, we also investigate 
whether church attendance
12 or religiosity
13 have an impact on preferences towards equality. 
The results indicate that church attendance is positively correlated with EP and religiosity 
negatively, but in both cases far away of being statistically significant for all conducted 
estimations presented in Table 5 and 6.  
 
  Finally we take a look at spatial variables. Looking at the SIZE OF TOWN, we 
observe that the reference group (size below 5.000) has the strongest preferences for income 
                                                 
12 Question: Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services 
these days? 8=More than once a week, 1= Never, practically never. 
 
13 Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are 3=A religious person, 2=Not a 
religious person, 3=A convinced atheist.  
 
 
  27equality. A strong familiarity among the citizens in such small towns (or better village) can be 
expected which may explain such preferences. On the other hand, we find that the lowest 
preferences towards income equality in towns with a population size 5.000 to 10.000 and 
10.000 to 20.000 inhabitants. Moreover, the results about regional dummies are very 
interesting too. We find negative coefficients in some SPANISH REGIONS, and the majority 
of those regions are characterized by having right wing governments and inequality levels 
below national level (INE, 2004). Another important finding is that those regions under 
nationalist governments, País Vasco and Cataluña, present low preferences for equality. Both 
regions are characterized by high-income levels too.  
 
  Table 7 includes the variables INCOME INEQUALITY and SOCIAL 
EXPENDITURES. In Eq. 9 we include only INCOME INEQUALITY. As can be seen the 
coefficient is highly statistically significant with a positive sign. Thus, greater inequality leads 
to stronger preferences towards equality. In Eq. 11, we present an estimation considering also 
SOCIAL EXPENDITURES. Also here the coefficient is statistically significant, but with 
lower marginal effects. A higher level of social expenditures leads to lower preferences 
towards income inequality. However, it can be argued that including an aggregated regional 
will produce downwardly biased standard errors. Thus, to check the robustness of the results 
we address the problem of heteroscedasticity by presenting standard errors adjusted for 
clustering on cantons. The advantage of this class of estimators is that they do not require a 
precise modelling of the heteroscedasticity source. Therefore, they are robust to 
heteroscedasticity of arbitrary form. In general, cluster estimators tend to increase the reported 
standard errors by a relatively large amount, which reduces the levels of statistical 
significance for the estimated coefficients. As can be seen in Eq. 10 and 12, the coefficient 
INCOME INEQUALITY remains highly statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
  28coefficient SOCIAL EXPENDITURES is not anymore significant. Nevertheless, the results 
clearly indicate that regional conditions matter.  
 
Table 7.- Preferences for equality and redistribution: regional conditions 
   weighted        weighted        weighted     weighted       
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  ordered probit     ordered probit     ordered probit     ordered probit   
          clustering on regions         clustering on regions 
PREFERENCES TOWARDS 
INCOME   Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
EQUALITY (INCOMES 
MORE EQUAL)     Effects    Effects    Effects    Effects 
INDEPENDENT  V.  9    10   11    12     
Socio-Demographic 
Factors (SOCDEM)                          
AGE                           
AGE  30-39  0.172  1.60  0.042 0.172  1.18  0.042 0.174  1.62 0.042 0.174  1.19  0.042 
AGE  40-49  0.067  0.56  0.016 0.067  0.48  0.016 0.064  0.53 0.015 0.064  0.46  0.015 
AGE  50-59  0.032  0.26  0.008 0.032  0.19  0.008 0.035  0.27 0.008 0.035  0.20  0.008 
AGE60-69  0.084  0.62  0.020 0.084  0.41  0.020 0.087  0.64 0.021 0.087  0.44  0.021 
AGE  70+  0.225  1.61  0.057 0.225  1.57  0.057 0.213  1.53 0.053 0.213  1.51  0.053 
GENDER                    
FEMALE  0.026  0.37  0.006 0.026  0.43  0.006 0.025  0.37 0.006 0.025  0.43  0.006 
MARITAL STATUS                    
MARRIED  -0.144*  -1.77 -0.034 -0.144  -1.64 -0.034 -0.152*  -1.87  -0.035  -0.152  -1.62  -0.035 
Formal and Informal 
Education (EDUC)                   
EDUCATION                    
MIDDLE  EDUCATION  -0.163*  -1.85 -0.036 -0.163  -1.50 -0.036 -0.156*  -1.77  -0.035  -0.156  -1.44  -0.035 
UPPER  EDUCATION  -0.215* -1.87  -0.046 -0.215* -1.72  -0.046 -0.213* -1.84  -0.045  -0.213* -1.68 -0.045 
IMPORTANCE OF 
POLITICS  0.139*** 3.31  0.032 0.139*** 3.05  0.032 0.137*** 3.26 0.032 0.137*** 2.91  0.032 
Economic Situation 
(ECONSIT)                   
FINANCIAL 
SATISFACTION  -0.043** -2.20 -0.010 -0.043  -1.15 -0.010 -0.043** -2.20  -0.010  -0.043  -1.13  -0.010 
ECONOMIC CLASS                    
UPPER  CLASS  -0.656 -1.23  -0.104 -0.656 -0.89  -0.104 -0.632 -1.17  -0.101  -0.632 -0.86  -0.101 
UPPER  MIDDLE  CLASS  -0.102 -1.01  -0.023 -0.102 -0.81  -0.023 -0.119 -1.18  -0.026  -0.119 -0.90  -0.026 
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.157**  -2.00  -0.035 -0.157**  -2.15  -0.035 -0.171** -2.16  -0.038  -0.171** -2.33  -0.038 
Occupational status 
(EMPLOY)                   
EMPLOYMENT STATUS                    
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.081 -0.56  -0.018 -0.081 -0.84  -0.018 -0.079 -0.55  -0.018  -0.079 -0.79  -0.018 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.052 -0.41  -0.012 -0.052 -0.30  -0.012 -0.066 -0.52  -0.015  -0.066 -0.39  -0.015 
Ideology and Social Capital 
(IDSC)                   
OTHERS TAKE 
ADVANTAGE  -0.260***  -3.65 -0.060 -0.260*** -2.78 -0.060 -0.257*** -3.63 -0.059 -0.257*** -2.76  -0.059 
TRUST IN THE 
PARLIAMENT  -0.115** -2.54 -0.027 -0.115  -1.43 -0.027 -0.125*** -2.75 -0.029 -0.125  -1.51  -0.029 
  29RELIGION 
DENOMINATION  -0.312***  -3.00 -0.080 -0.312*** -2.85 -0.080 -0.311*** -2.98 -0.080 -0.311*** -2.82  -0.080 
Location variables (LOC)                   
SIZE OF TOWN                    
2,000  -  5,000  -0.177 -0.97  -0.038 -0.177 -0.79  -0.038 -0.142 -0.77  -0.031  -0.142 -0.61  -0.031 
5 - 10,000  -0.599*** -3.29  -0.105 -0.599*** -3.45  -0.105 -0.602*** -3.30 -0.105 -0.602*** -3.47  -0.105 
10 - 20,000  -0.393**  -2.39  -0.076 -0.393**  -2.31  -0.076 -0.339** -2.04  -0.067  -0.339*  -1.87  -0.067 
20 - 50,000  -0.257  -1.49  -0.053 -0.257  -1.13  -0.053 -0.230 -1.33  -0.048  -0.230 -0.97  -0.048 
50 - 100,000  -0.311*  -1.81  -0.063 -0.311*  -1.75  -0.063 -0.287* -1.66  -0.059  -0.287  -1.53 -0.059 
100 - 500,000  -0.050  -0.32  -0.011 -0.050  -0.32  -0.011 -0.014 -0.09  -0.003  -0.014 -0.08  -0.003 
500,000 and more  -0.243  -1.48  -0.052 -0.243  -0.95  -0.052 -0.184 -1.11  -0.040  -0.184 -0.69  -0.040 
REGIONAL 
CONDITIONS                    
INCOME  INEQUALITY  14.067***  7.16  3.249 14.067***4.08  3.249 14.837***7.42 3.413 14.837***4.56  3.413 
SOCIAL  EXPENDITURES                -0.009**  -2.36  -0.002  -0.009  -1.35  -0.002 
(Pseudo) R2  0.031                 0.032                
Number of observations  946              946          
Prob > chi2   0.000                 0.000                




Although there are a few papers that investigate the factors that influence preferences 
for income equality and redistribution programs, we still know very little about people’s 
preferences about the distribution of income and redistribution policies in society. There is 
especially a lack of papers related to a country and its regions. Thus, this paper has the aim to 
reduce such shortcomings using World Values Survey data focusing on Spain (year 2000) and 
its regional conditions. Furthermore, the paper has the aim to search empirically for factors 
that have been strongly neglected in previous studies, such as, for example, informal 
education, perceptions about societies’ fairness, trust in institutions. Thus, compared to many 
previous studies, we have presented a richer set of independent variables to better isolate the 
impact of a specific variable on individuals’ preferences for improving income inequality and 
provide a test whether regional conditions such as income inequality or social expenditures 
matter. 
 
  30The results indicate not only regional differences, but also show that regional 
conditions matter. A higher income inequality at the regional level increases the preferences 
for income equality. On the other hand, governments’ effort to increase social expenditures in 
relation to the total regional public expenditures leads to lower preferences of equality and 
therefore a higher level of satisfaction with the income situation in the region. The regional 
differences also indicate that regions that have right or nationalist governments individuals 
have lower preferences for income equality.  
 
In general we also find that socio-demographic factors (age, gender) have a low 
impact on our dependent variable. On the other hand, variables such as economic status, 
education, political interest, ideology, trust in institution and perceptions about individuals’ 
fairness matter. Better-educated people are less in favor to redistribute and reduce inequality. 
Additionally, a higher political interest (importance of politics) is strongly correlated with 
preferences towards income equality. Surprisingly, this factor, which can also be seen as a 
proxy for informal education, has not been investigated in detail in previous studies.  
 
We also find that ideology matters. Right political orientation is correlated with a 
lower willingness to reduce income inequality. Furthermore, trust in the government and the 
parliament is associated with lower preferences towards income equality. This result cannot 
be interpreted without checking the political situation in Spain during the time the survey has 
been done. Around six moths before the survey was conducted in November 2000, José Maria 
Aznar was re-elected president. His Popular Party (PP) also obtained an absolute majority of 
seats in both the Congress of Deputies and the Senate as a result of the March 2000 election. 
Thus, it can be argued that trust is an indicator for citizens’ evaluation of the current political 
program. Traditionally, right wing party programs are less inclined to improve income 
inequality than left wing party programs. Thus, it is not a surprise that we observe a negative 
  31correlation between trust and our dependent variable. Furthermore, it is possible that people 
with a lower trust have a stronger preference and demand to improve the (social) situation in 
Spain.  
 
Interestingly, people without a religion denomination have stronger preferences to 
improve income inequality than people with a religion denomination, perhaps due to the fact 
that they are a minority in Spain. On the other hand, religiosity (negative sign) and church 
attendance (positive correlation) are not statistically significant. Interestingly, if people 
perceive that others are going to take advantage of them, they are less willing to reduce 
income inequality. Thus, individuals’ perception about others’ fairness help to explain 
preferences towards equality. We also observe that people living in a place with less than 
2000 have the strongest aversion against inequality, perhaps due to a higher level of 
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